Supplementary Online Appendix

Section 1: Survey details

Section 2: Survey questions and variable descriptions

Section 3: Estimation and Robustness tests

Section 1-- Survey Details

Egypt was a federal system divided into 27 states called governorates. For this study, these 27 states were categorized into 3 strata – rural, semi-urban and urban based on their shares of rural populations (CAPMAS 2010). Each governorate comprised an electoral district. The number of observations drawn from each stratum was proportional to the number of parliamentary seats it represented. We then randomly selected 4 clusters(governorates) in the urban strata – Matrouh, Suez, Cairo and Alexandria, 3 in the semi-rural strata – Damiatta, Ismailia and Qalubiyya and, 3 in the rural strata – Qena, El Sharkia and Fayoum for a total of 11 clusters. Candidates were then randomly selected from the lists of candidates running from the top 6 political parties in each governorate. The 6 parties with the highest average level of support in the top 5 polls in September, 2011 were chosen. These are the FJP, al Nour, New Wafd, Free Egyptians, al Wasat and Tagammu. This was necessary since more than 50 parties, most with no chance of winning and little public support, were competing in these elections. The total number of candidates from the six parties was 2431 and this was the target survey population. The survey instrument was in Arabic and completed in face-to-face interviews. The final size of the sample was 198 with a response rate of 58%. The sample size is therefore comparable to other studies of politicians by Rohrschneider 1994 (n=168), Miller, Vesli and Reisinger 1995 (n=112 in Russia, n=65 in Ukraine) and Sheffer et al 2018 (n= 44 in Israel, n=45 in Canada and n=113 in Belgium).

Egyptian election law required a judge to be present in every polling station. Given 50,000 plus polling stations and about 12,000 judges, the government fulfilled this requirement by

staggering elections in 3 stages in 2000, 2005 and then 2011-12 (but not 2010 elections). Neither statistical nor anecdotal evidence suggest that the assignment of states to stages was politically manipulated to create systematic biases in favor of any particular faction (El Sayyad and Hanafi 2011, Egyptian Organization for Human Rights 2012; The Carter Center). Table A1 shows the distribution of interviews across stages. Model 5 in table A3-c includes dummy variables for these stages and finds no significant effects of being interviewed in any specific stage. 2/3 of all parliamentary seats were composed through closed-list party lists and 1/3 through first-past-the-post rules. Since the same parties nominated candidates for both, the target population included candidates for both types of seats.

Table A1: Survey Implementation: Population =2431, Sample n=198

	People's Assembly (Elected seats= 498)	Election Day	# of Clusters Sampled	Period of Interviews	# of Interviews
Phase 1[a]	164 (33.33%)	Nov. 28-29 2011	4 out of 9	Oct. 10 – Nov. 25, 2011	83 (41.92%)
Phase 2[b]	182 (36.55%)	Dec. 14-15, 2011	3 out of 9	Dec 2 -Dec 14, 2011	50 (25.25%)
Phase 3[c]	150 (30.12%)	Jan. 3-4 2012	4 out of 9	Dec. 17-Jan. 5, 2012	65 (32.83%)

Sources for election details: Elections book, www.jadalliya.com, www.ahramonline.com, www.egyptindependent.com, Carter Center Report 2012, EISA Report 2012

[a] Governorates in Stage 1 – Alexandria, Asyut, Cairo, Damietta, Fayoum, Kafr El Sheikh, Port Said, Red Sea

[b] Governorates polled Stage 2 – Aswan, Beheira, Beni Suef, Giza, Islmailia, Menoufiya, Shariqiya, Sohag, Suez

[c] Governorates polled Stage 3 – Dakhaliya, Gharbiya, Matrouh, Minya, New Valley, North Sinai, Qalubiya, Qena, South Sinai

Section 2 -- Survey Questions

Dependent Variables

1. *Judicial Independence from Parliament (JI-P):* "Would you support increasing oversight of the judiciary by parliament?"

Responses were scaled from Strongly Oppose (0), Moderately Oppose (1), Oppose a little (2), Support a little (3), Moderately Support (4) to Strongly Support (5). A preference for increased oversight is considered consistent with a preference for reduced judicial independence (Helmke and Staton 2011; Gloppen et al; Hayo and Voigt 2007). We reversed the scale so that increasing values reflected increasing support for judicial independence. We then recoded 6-point scale variables into a simple binary variable to maximize degrees of freedom in estimation. Opposition to increasing legislative oversight a little, moderately or strongly was coded as 1, all levels of support for increasing oversight were coded as a 0. A 1 on this recoded variable JI-P now indicates support for increased judicial independence and 0 indicates opposition to it.

Independent Variables

1. *Personal Experience:* "Have you held elected office before? Yes/no" Yes coded 1, 0 otherwise. These responses were verified independently by the authors using election results and newspaper sources.

2. *Party Experience:* 1 if respondent belonged to a party which participated in the Egyptian parliament before the January 25th, 2011 uprising, 0 otherwise. Al Wafd, Tagammu, and FJP were coded 1. The FJP, the party formed by the Muslim Brotherhood, was legally registered after the January 25th revolution however, it held seats in parliament since the mid-1980s and importantly, campaigned, organized, legislated and voted as a coherent party caucus in the

parliament and was recognized as such by the ruling and other opposition parties (Masoud 2015; Brown 2012; Hamid 2014). Hence, it is coded as legislatively experienced.

Control Variables

1. **Party Disciplinary norms:** The following 2 questions were used to create two indices operationalizing party-level expectations about the importance of demonstrating loyalty to party's ideological beliefs, and of supporting the party's policy positions and legislative votes. Using the following scale: 0 no importance 1 some, 2 average, 3 very 4 decisive importance, please indicate

   (i) ***Party-Level Ideological Disciplinary Norms:*** "In your opinion, how important are the following qualities -- Candidate's loyalty to party ideology -- to your party when it chooses to support party members for -- (a) Election nominations, (b) Party Organization Positions and (c) party positions in Parliament"

   (ii) ***Party-Level Policy Disciplinary Norms:*** "In your opinion, how important are the following qualities -- Candidate's support for party positions and votes as a member of Congress-- to your party when it chooses to support party members for -- (a) Election nominations, (b) Party Organization Positions and (c) party positions in Parliament"

   Respondents scored the importance of each of these two qualities (*Ideological Discipline* and *Procedural Discipline*) for each of the three positions on a scale of 0 to 4. We average the score across the three positions for each quality, yielding two indices *Party Ideological Disciplinary Norms* and *Party Procedural Disciplinary Norms* ranging from 0 to 4. These indices are then used to control for respondent's belief of the importance of demonstrating party loyalty and policy support in their own parties.

2. **Judicial Theories**

   (i)   ***Policy Insurance -- Support Judicial Review:*** "Would you support reducing the powers of the judiciary to review government policy and parliamentary legislation?" Since Egyptian judges already had judicial review powers at the time hence, the question was worded in terms of reversing this status quo or maintaining it. Responses to this question were on a 6-point scale from Strongly Oppose to Strongly Support. These were reversed so that increasing values reflected increasing support for *maintaining* judicial review powers.

   (ii)   ***Support for Neoliberal Economic Reforms:*** To operationalize support for neo-liberal economic reforms, the survey asked respondents the following question about price reform in Egypt: "Do you support changing the law to allow agricultural products to sell at market prices, not controlled government prices?" Please use the following scale to indicate your position - 0 strongly oppose to 5 strongly support. Support for changing the law to allow sale at market prices was considered support for neo-liberal reforms.

   (iii)   ***Perception of Judicial Independence at the time of the study -- DFJI Perception:*** "The Supreme Court in Egypt makes legal decisions without being subject to political interference from any political agents." Scale: Strongly Disagree 0, Moderately Disagree 1, Disagree a little 2 Agree a little, 3 Moderately Agree 4 and Strongly Agree 5. This was included to control for the possibility that existing perceptions of the judiciary's independence could influence respondent's future support for JI in either direction.

3. ***Personal Demographics***

   (i) ***Age:*** "What is your age?" Continuous variable measured in years.

(ii) **_Ambition_**: "Thinking in terms of your professional trajectory, which position would you like to have next if: If you win: __" Responses such as representing an interest group's concerns, serving constituents, working on specific policy issues, etc. were coded as low personal ambition (0) and serving in executive position, committee position, party leadership position, etc. were coded as high ambition (1). 26.5% (47) of respondents expressed high ambition levels. Ambition was not significantly correlated with any type of experience level.

4. **Variables for Robustness Checks**

   (A) _Additional control variables:_

   (i) **_Time with current Party:_** The question "How long have you been a member of your current political party?" was used to operationalize a continuous variable _Time with Current Party_. This variable allows us to isolate the effect of office experience from simply being active in politics for a long time.

   (ii) **Public Sector Background:** Operationalized as 1 if respondent had a previous professional background serving in the public sector, coded 0 otherwise. Public sector employees maybe more supportive of government supervision over the judiciary.

   (iii) **Support for Human Rights**: The following question was used to operationalize respondent's personal support for human rights: "Would you support stopping trials of civilians in military and exceptional courts?" The scale used was: Strongly Oppose 0 Moderately Oppose 1 Oppose a little   Support a little 3   Moderately Support 4   Strongly Support 5. This had been the military regimes' preferred method for trying anyone they wanted silenced and such arrests and trials were also rampant during 2011 with more than 12000 arrests (Carter Center 2012) making this a salient issue that year as well. _Ceterus parib_us, more support for human rights should increase support for JI.

(iv) **Influence of Religious Organizations:** We use the following question to operationalize how influential a respondent believed religious organizations were among voters: "In your state, how much influence do you think the following groups have on the opinions and actions of voters in your state - religious groups" The scale used was 0 no influence, 1 some, 2 average, 3 high, 4 decisive influence. If a respondent believed that religious groups exerted more influence on voters, they could be more likely to oppose JI since religious groups tended to oppose judicial organizations on ideological grounds and could potentially mobilize voters against politicians who supported JI.

District Level Controls:

(v) **Stage 1, Stage 3:** Recall elections were held in three elections stages. 9 of 27 districts held elections at each stage. Binary variables coding whether a respondent's governorate held elections in round 1 or round 3 of the three-phase elections were created. Round 2 governorates form the reference category.

(iii) **District Demographics:** % Rural population in governorate was taken from the CAPMAS 2006 census (http://www.capmas.gov.eg/).

(iv) **Voter Support for Sharia-based legal system**: Uses qs # 47X from the Pew 2011 survey referenced earlier: "Which of the following three statements comes closer to your view –

1. laws in our country should strictly follow the teachings of the Quran,
2. laws in our country should follow the values and principles of Islam but not strictly follow the teachings of the Quran OR
3. laws in our country should not be influenced by the teachings of the Quran?

The % responding 1 or 2 in each governorate was operationalized as *Voter Support for Sharia.*

(vi) **Public Trust in Judiciary:** The following question from a 2011 Pew Survey from April 2011 was used to control for public trust in the judiciary: "In your state, how much influence

do you think the following groups have on the opinions and actions of voters: the judiciary? Influence scale: 0 no influence, 1 some influence, 2 average influence, 3 high influence to 4 decisive influence. % voters responding high or decisive influence in the politician's district was used to operationalize public trust, labelled Voter Trust in Judiciary.

(B) Domain-Specificity of Experience - Legislative versus General Political Experience:

Judicial Independence from the Executive (JI-E): "Would you support legislation to increase executive oversight of the judiciary?"

Responses were scaled from Strongly Oppose (0) to Strongly Support (5). As with JI-P, we reversed and recoded 6-point the scale into a simple binary variable so that increasing values reflected increasing support for judicial independence. 1 for JI-E indicates support for increased judicial independence from executive oversight and 0 indicates opposition to it.

(C) Ideological Robustness – Religious (FJP) vs. Non-Religious Party (Wafd) Analysis:

1. **FJ Party Member:** Coded 1 if respondent belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party, 0 otherwise

2. **New Wafd Party Member:** Coded 1 if respondent belonged to al Wafd Party, 0 otherwise.

Table A2: Summary of Dependent and Independent Variables

	Mean	Std. Deviation
Support Judicial Independence from Parliament (JI-P)	.601	.489
Support Judicial Independence from Executive (JI-E)	.525	.501
Respondents from Parties with Legislative Experience	.540	.499
Respondents with Personal Legislative Experience	.278	.449
Support Maintaining Judicial Review Powers	.540	.496
Respondent's Opinion on Existing DFJI	2.863	1.503
Party Ideological Discipline	3.034	.369
Party Procedural Discipline	2.976	.376
Voter Trust in Judiciary	96.79	.2.929
Pro-Market Ideology	3.217	1.554
Public Sector Employee	.328	.471
Age	47.06 years	9.575 years
Ambition	.266	.443
% Rural in respondent's District	57.24	28.506
Support for Sharia-Based legal system in respondent's district	70.683	11.424
Stage 1	.58	.494
Stage 3	.227	.420
Time with Current Party	5.279	10.553
Support for Human Rights	4.268	1.376
Influence of Religious Organizations	3.011	.864
Wafd	.076	.265
FJP	.278	.449

Sources for Election, Census and Polling Information

CAPMAS. 2006 National Census Report. Available at: http://www.capmas.gov.eg/

Carter Center. 2012. *Final Report of the Carter Center Mission to Witness the 2011–2012 Parliamentary Elections in Egypt.*

Egyptian Alliance for Election Monitoring 2012. *Parliamentary Elections 2011-2012 Report Summary.* Egypt: Cairo

El Sayyad, M. and S. Hanafi. 2014. "Voting Islamist or voting secular? An empirical analysis of voting outcomes in Egypt's "Arab Spring"" *Public Choice* 160:109–130

Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project 2011

Section 3: - Estimation and Robustness Results

Table A3a: Main Results Support for JI-P -- Maximum Likelihood Probit Models

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	Probit	Probit	2-level Probit	2-Level Probit
Party Experience	0.208 (0.417)	0.185 (0.464)	0.032 (0.357)	0.048 (0.359)
Personal Experience	**-2.487***** (0.579)	**-3.166***** (0.648)	**-3.678**** (1.152)	**-3.790**** (1.171)
Party Experience *Personal Experience	**2.260**** (0.817)	**3.007**** (0.956)	**3.798**** (1.233)	**3.882**** (1.248)
Personal DFJI Perception	0.071 (0.092)	0.028 (0.081)	0.015 (0.103)	0.014 (0.102)
Support Judicial Review	**1.814***** (0.348)	**2.017***** (0.283)	**2.053***** (0.413)	**2.094***** (0.413)
Ambition	**-0.928**** (0.319)	**-0.818**** (0.276)	**-1.071**** (0.376)	**-1.032**** (0.377)
Age	-0.010 (0.013)	-0.015 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.018)	-0.009 (0.018)
Pro-Market Ideology	0.055 (0.087)	0.045 (0.075)	0.038 (0.109)	0.056 (0.110)
Party Ideological Discipline	**-0.812**** (0.273)	**-1.072***** (0.198)	-0.834 (0.444)	**-0.927*** (0.447)
Party Procedural Discipline	**1.231***** (0.282)	**1.542***** (0.358)	**1.664***** (0.482)	**1.702***** (0.491)
% Rural Population		-0.005 (0.022)		-0.001 (0.043)
District Voter Confidence in Judiciary		**0.170**** (0.055)		0.145 (0.165)
District Voter Support for Sharia Legal System		-0.012 (0.013)		-0.000 (0.032)

Stage 1		0.867		0.851
		(0.990)		(1.392)
Stage 3		-0.784		-0.849
		(1.074)		(2.306)
Constant	-1.444	-16.944**	-2.471	-16.457
	(1.529)	(5.950)	(1.835)	(16.768)
Variance (Governorate)			1.280	0.864
			(0.918)	(0.679)
Observations	177	177	177	177
Clustered Errors[1]	Yes	Yes		
AIC	162.515	147.540	144.005	150.772
BIC	194.277	179.301	182.119	204.767

Standard errors in parentheses* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
[1]Respondents are embedded in 11 governorates (clusters).

Table A3b: Main Results Support for JI-P -- Adjusted **Restricted ML 2-Level Probit Models**, No Contextual Variables[1]

Model 5	Coefficient	Standard Error	Adjusted p-value
Party Experience	0.004	0.285	0.778
Personal Experience	**-3.737**	**0.872**	**0.003***
*Party Experience *Personal Experience*	**3.919**	**0.922**	**0.003***
Personal DFJI Perception	0.003	0.077	0.778
Support Judicial Review	**1.964**	**0.318**	**0.000***
Ambition	**-1.016**	**0.296**	**0.011***
Age	-0.007	0.013	0.672
Pro-Market Ideology	0.040	0.085	0.690
Party Ideological Discipline	-0.813	0.361	0.082
Party Procedural Discipline	**1.659**	**0.371**	**0.002***
Constant	-2.521	1.474	0.190
Dispersion Parameter	0.596		
RE Dispersion Parameter	1.613		
Dispersion Term	-0.517	0.115	
RE Dispersion Term	0.478	0.486	
Observations	177		
AIC	155.276		
BIC	196.055		

Standard errors in parentheses* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
[1]Respondents are embedded in 11 governorates (clusters).

Table A3-c: <u>Adjusted REML 2-Level Probit Models</u> With Contextual Variables - District
Socioeconomic Characteristics[1]

Model 6	Coefficient	Standard Error	Adjusted p-value
Party Experience	-0.003	0.307	0.773
Personal Experience	**-3.928**	**0.954**	**0.005***
*Party Experience *Personal Experience*	**4.088**	**0.992**	**0.005***
Personal DFJI Perception	0.006	0.080	0.771
Support Judicial Review	**1.996**	**0.329**	**0.000***
Ambition	**-1.016**	**0.305**	**0.015***
Age	-0.006	0.014	0.688
Pro-Market Ideology	0.056	0.089	0.621
Party Ideological Discipline	-0.854	0.373	0.080
Party Procedural Discipline	**1.715**	**0.385**	**0.003***
Duration Affiliated with Party	0.000	0.013	0.773
% Rural District Population	0.024	0.022	0.415
Stage 1 Governorate	-0.299	1.376	0.753
Constant	-3.692	1.738	0.103
Dispersion Parameter	0.601		
RE Dispersion Parameter	1.919		
Dispersion Term	-0.508	0.115	
RE Dispersion Term	0.652	0.548	
Observations	177		
AIC	152.970		
BIC	199.295		

[1]Respondents are embedded in 11 governorates (clusters).
Standard errors in parentheses* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A3-d: <u>Adjusted REML 2-Level Probit Models</u> With Contextual Variables - District-Level
Voter Sentiment

Model 7	Coefficient	Standard Error	Adjusted p-value
Party Experience	-0.022	0.306	0.771
Personal Experience	**-3.875**	**0.924**	**0.004***
*Party Experience *Personal Experience*	**4.069**	**0.968**	**0.004***
Personal DFJI Perception	0.003	0.080	0.773
Support Judicial Review	**2.001**	**0.329**	**0.000***
Ambition	**-1.023**	**0.303**	**0.014***
Age	-0.007	0.014	0.671
Pro-Market Ideology	0.041	0.088	0.685
Party Ideological Discipline	-0.823	0.370	0.088
Party Procedural Discipline	**1.690**	**0.381**	**0.003***
Duration Affiliated with Party	0.001	0.013	0.772
% District Voters Trust Judiciary	0.030	0.182	0.762
% District Voters Support Sharia as Law	0.014	0.038	0.718
Constant	-6.499	16.924	0.712

Dispersion Parameter	0.597	
RE Dispersion Parameter	2.248	
Dispersion Term	-0.516	0.116
RE Dispersion Term	0.810	0.535
Observations	177	
AIC	156.486	
BIC	195.553	

Standard errors in parentheses* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
[1]Respondents are embedded in 11 governorates (clusters).

Figure A.1: Marginal Effects of Experienced Party and Personal Experience – **Using REML Model 7 Estimates**


(a) ME of Personal Experience

(b) ME of Party Experience

Figure A.2: Marginal Effects of *Experienced Party* & *Personal Experience* – Using <u>ML Model 4</u> Estimates

Robustness Tests

(A) Robustness Tests 1: Additional Controls

Table A4: Robustness Check 1 –Additional Individual and District Characteristics **ML 2-Level** Probit Models[1]

	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11
Party Experience	-0.070	-0.069	0.083	0.106
	(0.320)	(0.323)	(0.414)	(0.408)
Personal Experience	**-2.867****	**-2.899****	**-3.854****	**-3.783****
	(0.958)	**(0.959)**	**(1.283)**	**(1.250)**
*Party Experience *Personal Experience*	**3.129****	**3.148****	**3.963****	**3.803****
	(1.032)	**(1.032)**	**(1.345)**	**(1.312)**
Support Judicial Review			**1.972*****	**1.900*****
			(0.464)	**(0.450)**
Public Sector Background			0.335	0.329
			(0.363)	(0.360)
Years w/Current Party			-0.003	0.000
			(0.018)	(0.018)
Support for Human Rights			0.185	0.142
			(0.141)	(0.135)
Influence of Religious Groups			0.124	0.144
			(0.228)	(0.225)
Personal DFJI Perception	0.012	0.015	0.004	-0.007
	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.114)	(0.112)
Ambition	**-1.195*****	**-1.175*****	**-1.023***	**-0.988***
	(0.355)	**(0.356)**	**(0.402)**	**(0.398)**
Age	-0.014	-0.015	-0.017	-0.017
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Pro-Market Ideology	0.115	0.132	0.041	0.062
	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.114)	(0.113)
Party Ideological Discipline	-0.279	-0.327	-0.959	-0.939
	(0.386)	(0.388)	(0.501)	(0.488)

Party Procedural Discipline	**1.032**** **(0.398)**	**1.050**** **(0.402)**	**1.498**** **(0.550)**	**1.542**** **(0.543)**
% Rural Population		0.000 (0.046)		0.025 (0.052)
District Voter Confidence in Judiciary		0.012 (0.176)		0.132 (0.191)
District Voter Support for Sharia Legal System		0.008 (0.034)		-0.025 (0.042)
Stage 1		0.211 (1.492)		-0.047 (1.746)
Stage 3		-0.968 (2.477)		-0.456 (2.516)
Constant	-1.191 (1.660)	-2.647 (17.768)	-2.448 (2.220)	-14.837 (20.115)
Variance (Governorate)	1.388 (0.907)	1.154 (0.767)	1.717 (1.401)	0.903 (0.896)
Observations	177	177	161	161
AIC	175.541	183.246	142.656	149.374
BIC	210.478	234.065	191.958	214.083

Standard errors in parentheses* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
[1]Respondents are embedded in 11 governorates (clusters).

(B) **Robustness Test 2: Balance Tests**

Table A5.1: Balance Tests for <u>Candidates:</u> Experienced vs. New & Inexperienced Parties

Variable	Number of Obs.	Experienced Parties: Mean (Std. Dev.)	New & Inexperienced Parties: Mean (Std. Dev.)	Difference in Parties (t-tests)
Age	198	47.03 (.899)	47.10 (1.042)	NS
Education	188	.971 (.036)	.880 (.016)	NS
Professional History	195	.317 (.046)	.341 (.050)	NS
Share of Dynastic Politicians	198	.224 (.041)	.143 (.037)	NS
Left-Right Ideology	198	3.178 (.148)	3.263 (.167)	NS
Ambition	177	.316 (.047)	.292 (.046)	NS
Experience with Other Parties	198	.262 (.043)	.187 (.041)	NS
DFJI	198	2.888 (.148)	2.835 (.155)	NS
Support Judicial Review	198	2.551 (.179)	2.527 (.174)	NS
Support Civilian Trials	198	4.336 (.124)	4.187 (.155)	NS

*All respondents were male.

Table A5.2: Balance tests for <u>Districts</u> - Experienced vs. New and Inexperienced Parties

Variable	Number of Obs.	Exper. Parties: Mean (Std. Dev.)	New & Inexper. Parties: Mean (Std. Dev.)	Difference in Parties (t-tests)
% Rural Population	198	57.360 (2.908)	57.101 (2.799)	NS
% Literacy	198	29.797 (.754)	30.367 (.767)	NS
% University Educated	198	8.890 (.449)	7.904 (.352)	NS
% Population Employed in Agriculture	198	11.064 (.567)	11.806 (.537)	NS
% Population Employed in Manufacturing	198	5.303 (2.282)	4.887 (2.635)	NS
% Population Employed in Services	198	20.024 (.338)	20.020 (.289)	NS
% Population Employed in Public Sector	198	3.519 (.053)	3.586 (.059)	NS
Unemployment Rate	198	9.818 (.214)	9.525 (.246)	NS
Pew Voter Survey (April 2011) in Respondent's District				
% Favorable View of Courts' Influence	198	65.592 (.752)	65.554 (.752)	NS
% Public Trust in Courts	198	96.42 (.287)	97.24 (.296)	NS
% Support Sharia Law	198	69.850 (1.129)	71.661 (1.163)	NS
% Support Democracy	198	72.736 (.602)	72.769 (.630)	NS
% Favorable View of Military's Influence	198	86.635 (.605)	86.034 (.609)	NS
% Unfavorable View of Military's Influence	198	13.121 (.604)	13.758 (5.847)	NS
% Support Mubarak	198	11.326 (.576)	11.977 (.544)	NS
% Opposed to MB	198	11.326 (.576)	11.977 (.544)	NS
% Believing Favorable Economic Situation in District	198	30.125 (.773)	30.523 (.813)	NS

% Believing Unfavorable Economic Situation in District	198	68.358 (.762)	67.974 (.813)	NS
% Favorable View of Religious Leaders' Influence	198	77.623 (.759)	78.341 (.858)	NS

(C) Placebo Outcome Test for Validity of Design: Test of Domain-Specificity of Experience Using JI-E

Table A6-a: Robustness Check 2 -- ML Probit and 2-Level Probit Results for **JI-Executive**[1]

	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15
Party Experience	0.157 (0.305)	0.162 (0.328)	0.086 (0.298)	0.089 (0.303)
Personal Experience	-0.287 (0.462)	-0.305 (0.573)	-0.217 (0.491)	-0.254 (0.503)
*Party Experience *Personal Experience*	-0.279 (0.629)	-0.255 (0.710)	-0.250 (0.593)	-0.246 (0.596)
Personal DFJI Perception	-0.056 (0.084)	-0.077 (0.082)	-0.098 (0.084)	-0.096 (0.085)
Support Judicial Review	**1.923****** (0.256)**	**1.988****** (0.248)**	**1.874****** (0.286)**	**1.916****** (0.288)**
Ambition	-0.298 (0.423)	-0.281 (0.425)	-0.328 (0.296)	-0.308 (0.299)
Age	0.002 (0.013)	-0.002 (0.014)	-0.004 (0.014)	-0.004 (0.014)
Pro-Market Ideology	-0.041 (0.055)	-0.019 (0.054)	-0.025 (0.083)	-0.005 (0.085)
Party Ideological Discipline	**-0.596*** (0.274)**	**-0.843****** (0.224)**	**-0.662*#** (0.365)**	**-0.798*** (0.366)**
Party Procedural Discipline	**0.875*#** (0.478)**	**1.054*** (0.501)**	**1.048****** (0.368)**	**1.099****** (0.379)**
% Rural Population		-0.020 (0.018)		-0.025 (0.025)

District Voter Confidence in Judiciary		0.021		-0.010
		(0.067)		(0.086)
District Voter Support for Sharia Legal System		-0.010		-0.004
		(0.011)		(0.019)
Stage 1		0.194		0.243
		(0.572)		(0.722)
Stage 3		-1.856		-2.092
		(1.029)		(1.359)
Constant	-1.414	-0.958	-1.396	1.882
	(1.321)	(7.246)	(1.499)	(8.648)
Variance (Governorate)			0.237	0.135
			(0.200)	(0.143)
Observations	177	177	177	177
AIC	182.930	176.264	182.203	188.305
BIC	214.692	208.025	220.317	242.300

Standard errors in parentheses[*] $p < 0.05$, [**] $p < 0.01$, [***] $p < 0.001$
[1]Respondents are embedded in 11 governorates (clusters).

Table A6-b: Robustness Check 2: <u>Adjusted REML 2-Level Probit Models</u> for **JI-Executive – No** Contextual Variables[1]

Model 16	Coefficient	Standard Error	Adjusted p-value
Party Experience	0.106	0.281	0.720
Personal Experience	-0.607	0.503	0.368
*Party Experience *Personal Experience*	0.118	0.587	0.761
Personal DFJI Perception	-0.119	0.078	0.246
Support Judicial Review	**1.903**	**0.282**	**0.000*****
Ambition	-0.362	0.280	0.333
Age	-0.007	0.013	0.678
Pro-Market Ideology	-0.013	0.079	0.767
Party Ideological Discipline	-0.633	0.333	0.143
Party Procedural Discipline	**1.282**	**0.354**	**0.008*****
Constant	-2.082	1.419	0.266
Dispersion Parameter	0.865		
RE Dispersion Parameter	0.300		
Dispersion Term	-0.145	0.114	
RE Dispersion Term	-1.205	0.578	
Observations	177		
AIC	188.904		
BIC	245.183		

Standard errors in parentheses[*] $p < 0.05$, [**] $p < 0.01$, [***] $p < 0.001$

Table A6-c: Robustness Check 2: <u>**Adjusted REML 2-Level Probit**</u> Results for JI-Executive – **With All Contextual** District-Level Controls[1]

Model 17	Coefficient	Standard Error	Adjusted p-value
Party Experience	0.122	0.302	0.687
Personal Experience	-0.651	0.527	0.219
*Party Experience *Personal Experience*	0.164	0.610	0.789
Personal DFJI Perception	-0.133	0.081	0.101
Support Judicial Review	**1.94**	**0.298**	**0.000*****
Ambition	-0.363	0.293	0..217
Age	-0.007	0.013	0.601
Pro-Market Ideology	0.021	0.083	0.798
Party Ideological Discipline	-0.750	0.350	0.114
Party Procedural Discipline	**1.405**	**0.378**	**0.000*****
% Rural District Population	-0.023	0.034	0.507
Stage 1 Governorate	0.280	1.061	0.792
Stage 3 Governorate	-2.059	1.857	.269
% District Voters Trust Judiciary	-0.032	0.128	0.801
% District Voters Support Sharia as Law	-0.003	0.026	0.915
Constant	2.834	12.865	0.826
Dispersion Parameter	0.866		
RE Dispersion Parameter	0.512		
Dispersion Term	-0.144	0.115	
RE Dispersion Term	-0.669	0.753	
Observations	177		
AIC	189.218		
BIC	244.005		

Standard errors in parentheses[*] $p < 0.05$, [**] $p < 0.01$, [***] $p < 0.001$

(D)Robustness Test 3: The Effects of Experience in Ideologically Distinct Parties

Table A7-a: Robustness Check 3: ML 2-Level Probit Models -- Experience in Religious vs. Non-Religious Parties & Support for JI-P[1]

	Model 18	Model 19
Parliamentary Experience	**-2.658***	**-2.755***
	(0.802)	**(0.822)**
FJP	0.536	0.527
	(0.433)	(0.435)
*FJP*Parliamentary Experience*	**2.483***	**2.586**
	(0.982)	**(0.994)**
Wafd	-0.539	-0.569
	(0.562)	(0.564)
Wafd Parliamentary Experience*	**3.197**	**3.280**
	(1.168)	**(1.183)**
Personal DFJI Perception	0.011	0.009
	(0.102)	(0.101)
Support Judicial Review	**2.049***	**2.107***
	(0.420)	**(0.425)**
Ambition	**-1.109**	**-1.071**
	(0.379)	**(0.380)**
Age	-0.008	-0.009
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Pro-Market Ideology	0.038	0.051
	(0.107)	(0.108)
Party Ideological Disciplinary Norms	-0.604	-0.679
	(0.457)	(0.462)
Party Procedural Disciplinary Norms	**1.844***	**1.894***
	(0.537)	**(0.553)**
% Rural Population		-0.007
		(0.043)
Voter Confidence in Judiciary		0.164
		(0.170)

Voter Support for Sharia Legal System		0.014
		(0.033)
Stage 1		1.310
		(1.435)
Stage 3		-0.575
		(2.326)
Constant	-3.663	-20.588
	(1.973)	(17.339)
Variance (Governorate Intercept)	1.252	0.904
	(0.900)	(0.700)
Observations	177	177
AIC	147.817	154.918
BIC	192.283	215.264

Standard errors in parentheses* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
[1]Respondents are embedded in 11 governorates (clusters).

Table A7-b: Robustness Check 3: **Adjusted REML 2-Level Probit Models** -- Experience in Religious vs. Non-Religious Parties & Support for JI-P, **Without Contextual Variables**[1]

Model 20	**Coefficient**	**Standard Error**	**Adjusted p-value**
FJP	0.454	0.335	0.308
Wafd	-0.594	0.454	0.327
Personal Experience	**-2.670**	**0.621**	**0.002***
FJP Personal Experience*	**2.614**	**0.742**	**0.009***
Wafd Personal Experience*	**3.317**	**0.910**	**0.007***
Personal DFJI Perception	0.002	0.078	0.778
Support Judicial Review	**1.948**	**0.326**	**0.000***
Ambition	**-1.053**	**0.299**	**0.009***
Age	-0.007	0.014	0.685
Pro-Market Ideology	0.036	0.084	0.704
Party Ideological Discipline	-0.604	0.368	0.210
Party Procedural Discipline	**1.801**	**0.432**	**0.003***
Constant	-3.504	1.587	0.088
Dispersion Parameter	0.606		
RE Dispersion Parameter	1.552		
Dispersion Term	-0.500	0.116	
RE Dispersion Term	0.440	0.487	
Observations	177		
AIC	155.629		
BIC	218.589		

Standard errors in parentheses* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

[1]Respondents are embedded in 11 governorates (clusters).

Table A7-c: Robustness Check 3: <u>**Adjusted REML 2-Level Probit Models**</u> -- Religious vs Non-Religious Legacy Parties – **With Contextual Variables (**District Socioeconomic Characteristics)[1]

Model 21	Coefficient	Standard Error	Adjusted p-value
FJP	0.445	0.369	0.229
Wafd	-0.623	0.470	0.187
Personal Experience	**-2.792**	**0.669**	**0.000***
FJP Personal Experience*	**2.769**	**0.779**	**0.000***
Wafd Personal Experience*	**3.453**	**0.944**	**0.000***
Personal DFJI Perception	-0.002	0.081	0.985
Support Judicial Review	**1.999**	**0.340**	**0.000***
Ambition	**-1.074**	**0.310**	**0.001***
Age	-0.006	0.014	0.677
Pro-Market Ideology	0.049	0.086	0.571
Party Ideological Discipline	-0.657	0.385	0.090
Party Procedural Discipline	**1.872**	**0.449**	**0.000***
Duration Affiliated with Party	-0.002	0.013	0.855
% Rural District Population	0.003	0.062	0.957
Stage 1 Governorate	0.211	1.739	0.904
Stage 3 Governorate	-1.183	3.271	.718
Constant	-3.103	4.065	0.446
Dispersion Parameter	0.605		
RE Dispersion Parameter	2.415		
Dispersion Term	-0.503	0.116	
RE Dispersion Term	0.882	0.578	
Observations	177		
AIC	159.003		
BIC	216.051		

Standard errors in parentheses[*] $p < 0.05$, [**] $p < 0.01$, [***] $p < 0.001$
[1]Respondents are embedded in 11 governorates (clusters).

Table A7--d: **Robustness Check 3: <u>Adjusted REML 2-Level Probit Models</u>** -- Religious vs Non-Religious Legacy Parties -- With Contextual Variables (District-Level Voter Sentiment)[1]

Model 22	Coefficient	Standard Error	Adjusted p-value
FJP	0.472	0.366	0.332
Wafd	-0.628	0.469	0.312
Personal Experience	**-2.739**	**0.653**	**0.004***
FJP Personal Experience*	**2.728**	**0.768**	**0.011***
Wafd Personal Experience*	**3.461**	**0.939**	**0.009***
Personal DFJI Perception	-0.002	0.081	0.773
Support Judicial Review	**1.977**	**0.336**	**0.000***
Ambition	**-1.069**	**0.307**	**0.012***
Age	-0.007	0.014	0.686
Pro-Market Ideology	0.039	0.086	0.690
Party Ideological Discipline	**-0.600**	**0.379**	0.227
Party Procedural Discipline	**1.818**	**0.441**	**0.005***
Duration Affiliated with Party	-0.004	0.013	0.741
% District Voters Trust Judiciary	0.033	0.176	0.758
% District Voters Support Sharia as Law	0.021	0.037	0.644
Constant	-8.305	16.281	0.670
Dispersion Parameter	0.607		
RE Dispersion Parameter	2.060		
Dispersion Term	-0.499	0.116	
RE Dispersion Term	0.723	0.538	
Observations	177		
AIC	159.018		
BIC	220.118		

Standard errors in parentheses[*] $p < 0.05$, [**] $p < 0.01$, [***] $p < 0.001$
[1]Respondents are embedded in 11 governorates (clusters).

(E) Using Categorical Measures of JI-P

Table A8: Ordered Probit Models with Categorical Measures of JI-P[1]

Model 23	JI-Parliament			JI-Executive		
	Model 19	Model 20	Model 21	Model 22	Model 23	Model 24
Party Experience	0.387 (0.224)	0.232 (0.220)	0.906** (0.335)	-0.013 (0.217)	-0.122 (0.214)	0.272 (0.270)
Personal Experience	**-0.697*** **(0.342)**	**-0.698*** **(0.339)**	**-0.552**** **(0.189)**	-0.200 (0.328)	-0.112 (0.328)	-0.016 (0.490)
Party Experience* Personal Experience	**0.606*** **(0.422)**	**0.861*** **(0.418)**	**-0.914*** **(0.575)**	0.106 (0.409)	0.185 (0.406)	-0.276 (0.623)
Personal DFJI Perception	0.102 (0.067)	0.073 (0.065)	0.057 (0.062)	-0.010 (0.062)	-0.028 (0.062)	-0.010 (0.051)
Support Judicial Review	**1.308**** **(0.222)**		**1.501**** **(0.204)**	**1.284**** **(0.212)**		**1.467**** **(0.194)**
Ambition	-0.428 (0.235)	**-0.473*** **(0.231)**	-0.405 (0.295)	0.015 (0.215)	-0.103 (0.218)	-0.059 (0.298)
Age	-0.016 (0.010)	**-0.022*** **(0.010)**	**-0.015*** **(0.008)**	-0.005 (0.010)	-0.012 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.009)
Public Sector Job	0.073 (0.197)	-0.019 (0.194)	0.167 (0.155)	0.134 (0.191)	0.057 (0.190)	**0.204*** **(0.088)**
Pro-Market Ideology	0.030 (0.063)	0.088 (0.061)	0.043 (0.029)	0.003 (0.060)	0.057 (0.059)	0.009 (0.058)
Party Ideological Discipline	-0.470 (0.252)	-0.251 (0.248)	-0.118 (0.638)	-0.284 (0.246)	-0.037 (0.243)	-0.282 (0.465)
Party Procedural Discipline	**0.834**** **(0.271)**	**0.559*** **(0.265)**	**0.766**** **(0.138)**	**0.704**** **(0.260)**	0.444 (0.255)	**0.801*** **(0.340)**
Voter Confidence in Judiciary			0.088 (0.063)			**0.090*** **(0.036)**
Voter Support for Sharia Legal System			**-0.026*** **(0.012)**			**-0.021**** **(0.007)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
% Rural Population			0.002 (0.006)			0.003 (0.004)
Threshold Parameters						
Cutoff 1	0.034 (1.150)	-0.883 (1.130)	9.530 (6.486)	0.629 (1.092)	-0.255 (1.086)	**9.583* (4.405)**
Cutoff 2	0.683 (1.147)	-0.324 (1.127)	10.125 (6.435)	1.405 (1.093)	0.423 (1.085)	**10.366* (4.197)**
Cutoff 3	0.970 (1.148)	-0.084 (1.127)	10.383 (6.411)	1.617 (1.093)	0.600 (1.084)	**10.575* (4.154)**
Cutoff 4	1.653 (1.152)	0.507 (1.128)	**10.923 (6.294)**	1.893 (1.095)	0.830 (1.085)	**10.826** (4.081)**
Cutoff 5	**2.537* (1.160)**	1.319 (1.133)	11.697 (6.336)	**2.919** (1.106)**	1.779 (1.093)	**11.759** (4.045)**
Variance (Governorate Intercept)	0.515 (0.275)	**0.620* (0.313)**		0.154 (0.100)	0.290 (0.156)	
Observations	176	176	169	176	176	169
AIC	518.293	551.509	501.643	545.525	579.659	510.442
BIC	572.192	602.237	532.942	599.423	630.387	541.741

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

[1]Respondents are embedded in 11 governorates (clusters).